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We develop a household model of migrant remittance that accounts for the effects of transaction 
costs on remittances.  The model supports testable hypotheses about the effect on remittances of 
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security, and other household characteristics on remittance levels and frequency.  We test these 
hypotheses using survey data on individual Mexican migrants in the United States.  The results 
are broadly consistent with our hypotheses.   
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We develop a household model of migrant remittance that accounts for the effects of transaction 
costs on remittances.  The model supports testable hypotheses about the effect on remittances of 
migrant income, family composition and distribution, transaction costs, income and residence 
security, and other household characteristics on remittance levels and frequency.  We test these 
hypotheses using survey data on individual Mexican migrants in the United States.  The results 
are broadly consistent with our hypotheses. 
 
I.   Introduction 
 
Remittances by international migrants to developing countries are now as important as foreign 
direct investment in terms of their impact on the balance of direct payments and poverty 
alleviation.  According to World Bank data, worker remittances sent to developing countries 
through  market channels rose from $31.0 billion in 1990 to $189.5 billion in 2005 (World Bank, 
2007), and the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) estimated the 2006 
flows at $301 billion.  In contrast, net foreign direct investment in 2005 was $280.8 billion 
(World Bank, 2007).  Remittances on averaged 4 percent of GDP in Africa and were the 
equivalent of 13 percent of exports in Latin America and the Caribbean (IFAD, 2007). 
The macroeconomic impact of remittances manifests itself largely through the balance of 
payments. Some estimates suggest that exchange rate appreciation could lessen the positive 
impact or even negate it, but this is not a widely held view (Adams, 2007).  Remittances also 
augment domestic savings and stimulate small business activity (IFAD, 2007). Poverty 
alleviation from remittances is such that recipient families spend on consumption relative to 
  0investment items like education, housing and other entrepreneurial activities.  The relative size 
and growth rate of remittances has drawn attention to their potential development impact in the 
recipient countries as well as factors that determine who remits and how much they remit. 
This paper develops a household model of remittances and tests several implications of 
the model using survey data on individual Mexican migrants in the United States. Our theoretical 
model allows for variation in the distribution of household assets and liabilities across the home 
and host countries, and explicitly addresses the impact of remittances transaction costs by mode 
of remittance.  The model provides testable implications regarding the effect of migrant income, 
transaction costs, and other household characteristics on migrant remittance levels. Remittance 
frequency and mode are endogenous determinants that are related to transaction costs.  We 
generate instruments that correct for potential estimator inconsistency due to endogeneity and 
reflect endogenous transaction costs. Our model results are broadly consistent with our 
hypotheses regarding of income effects, household distribution of assets and liabilities, expected 
stay in the U.S., and transaction costs. Even when the estimated relationships are not individually 
statistically significant, there are compelling patterns in the results that are consistent with the 
theory. 
Economic models of remittances can be approached as extensions of models for 
explaining rural to urban migration. In Todaro, (1969)  the decision to migrate is a function of 
the expected urban-rural wage differential, where the urban wage is discounted by the probability 
of getting urban employment. Migration can also viewed as an informal intra-household contract 
requiring the migrant remits part of his income to remaining family members for household 
services rendered at home, or as a form of individual insurance against unemployment, to secure 
  1a bequest upon returning home, or even a combination of these reasons (Stark and Levhari, 1982; 
Stark, 1991; Hoddinott, 1994; Poirine, 1997; Liu and Reilly, 2004).  
Another perspective is that remittances are motivated by altruism (Lucas and Stark 1985; 
Agarwal and Horowitz 2002).  Altruism implies that the migrant’s utility is a function of the 
migrant’s consumption as well as the utility of other household members (Stark, 1995; Magee 
and Thomson, 2006; Glytsos, 2002; Bouhga-Hagbe, 2004)
.  Other models link the altruism and 
contractual perspectives on migration and remittances (Lucas and Stark 1985).  
Empirical results have generally supported the altruism hypothesis (Boughba-Hagbe, 
2004; Agarwal and Horowitz, 2002) or altruism and self-interest (Lucas and Stark, 1985).  There 
are some contradictions, however.  Time series evidence shows a negative elasticity of 
remittances with regard to per capita GDP, which would support the altruism motive and the 
constant consumption ratio hypothesis.  Results based on pooled data across countries show a 
positive GDP elasticity (Adams, 2007).  This suggests that investment or portfolio 
diversification, rather than altruism, may drive remittances.  Other studies estimate the level of 
remittances as a function of country or cultural characteristics, such as the desire to inherit the 
family assets upon return (Hoddinott, 1994), support of a national cause (Magee and Thompson, 
2006) or the repayment of informal loan arrangements (Ilahi and Jafarey, 1988). 
Remittances are also a function of transactions costs.  Intra-country, urban-rural 
remittances largely use informal channels, and the costs are probably minimal.  Remittances to 
Mexico and Latin America, however, go through a variety of formal channels.  Data for 1999-
2000 showed that 66 percent of the remittances to Mexico went through non-bank money 
transfer methods (MTFs), 12 percent through informal channels and 17 percent through 
  2commercial banks  (Amuendo-Dorantes, Bansak and Pozo, 2004).  The share of MTFs is higher 
for funds remitted to rural areas, and for illegal migrants.  The costs vary by type of institution, 
country of destination and requested speed of delivery.  MTFs charges fell from 15 percent of 
total transaction value in the 1990s to 5 percent by 2005 (CBO, 2005) and they vary by type of 
service selected. Credit Unions, on the other hand, charge a flat fee of less than one percent and 
no foreign currency conversion fees. MTFs and banks also levied charges on the recipient when 
converting the funds into Mexican currency, and these fees are variable (CUNA and Affiliates, 
2003).    
Migrant workers make their migration decisions based in part on imperfect information 
about their future income and living costs in the host country.  Once employed, it is not 
inconceivable for a migrant to live in nothing more than minimum subsistence conditions while 
remitting as much as possible to provide for family members whom reside in the home country, 
or to support investment in the home country.
1  Having moved to the host country and securing a 
job, if actualized income is above the migrant’s subsistence level, the migrant may be willing to 
remit.  If the migrant’s needs and the total costs of sending the remittances equal or exceed the 
migrant’s income the migrant will not to remit, despite possible plans to do so.  
Thus, the determinants of remittances are based on motivations to remit and the capacity 
to remit, which in turn is contingent on a positive net income, and the costs of remitting.  
                                                      
 
1 There are no comprehensive income statistics for migrants.  In the US, however, Bureau of the Census data on the 
Hispanic population (of which Mexican migrants are a subset) show that 40 percent of the documented and 32.2 
percent of the undocumented migrants are employed in agriculture with an hourly wage below the national average.  
Hispanics had the lowest distribution by level of education, with 39 percent having less than a high school diploma 
and 52 percent of the total population had a family income of less than $35,000 in 2004 prices  (US Bureau of the 
Census, 2004).    
  3IFAD(2007) and Bernanke (2004)  argue for a reduction in remittance fees as a way of 
increasing total remittance flow, but do not offer any evidence on the expected level of response.  
Theoretical models recognize the existence of remittance charges but either assume a single 
remittance mode (Magee and Thompson, 2006) or informal channels where costs are 
insignificant (Boughba-Hagbe 2004; Lucas and Stark, 1985). 
Our paper contributes to both the theoretical and the empirical literature on remittances 
by examining the relationship between remittances levels, the frequency of remittances and 
remittance costs.  The current literature recognizes the importance of transaction costs and the 
relatively low income of migrants (IFAD, 2007; Bernanke, 2004;  Magee and Thomson, 2006; 
Boughba-Hagbe, 2004).  However, transaction costs have not been incorporated in a formal way 
into the published theoretical and empirical economic studies.  We develop a utility 
maximization model in which an income constraint is added to a budget constraint that accounts 
for both marginal and per-transfer remittance costs.  The amount remitted is determined by 
utility maximization subject to the income constraint and exogenous household characteristics. 
This theoretical model provides several hypotheses that we test using data from a survey 
of Mexican migrant workers in the United States.  Because of the characteristics of our data, we 
use a modified Generalized Ordered Probit model to test hypotheses that follow from our 
theoretical model.    Hoddinott (1992) observed that prior empirical work on remittances had not 
addressed the distinction between the explanatory variables’ effects on the likelihood of 
remitting and the level of remittances.  He corrected the omission by using a generalized (Type 
II) Tobit model (also called a Heckit model) that allows the censoring process to be determined 
by a different index function than the rest of the distribution.  Because we have categorical 
remittance data, we adapt the generalized ordered Probit model to allow the probability of no 
  4remittance (that is, remittance=0) to be determined by an index function that differs from the 
remittance level index (given positive remittances).  We also account for endogenous remittance 
frequency in estimation using an instrumental variable approach.    
  The paper is organized as follows.  Section II consists of a theoretical model and a set of 
hypotheses to be tested.  Data and the econometric model are described in Section III.  A 
discussion of the results is in Section IV, and section V concludes. 
II.  Theory 
  We start with Lucas and Stark’s (1985) utility function, but modify it to account for the impact 
of household composition differences between the U.S. and Mexico.  The migrant may bring  some 
family members to the U.S. while others remain in Mexico, and households may have varying portfolios 
of assets and liabilities in Mexico and the U.S.  This will affect the marginal rate of substitution 
between household consumption in the U.S. versus remittances sent to Mexico.  For our 
purposes, the migrant’s utility function will be defined as 
   (1)  ()
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us p household members in 
the U.S. and 
mx p household members in Mexico;
  1
mx p
i i R r
= =∑
mx
 is the total remittance received in 
Mexico and distributed as   for individual i over  i r p  household members; n is the number 
(frequency) of remittances per year, and Z are household characteristics. Family member weights 
ai and bi  may differ in the migrant’s utility (e.g. the spouse relative to the children, children in 
Mexico relative to children in the U.S.).  Utility in Mexico is dependent on remittance frequency 
  5n, and the dollar amount of each remittance, R/n.
2    Annual average per person remittances are
mx rR p = .
3     
Consider the following timeframe and decision process.  A Mexican worker chooses to 
migrate if the expected benefits of doing so outweigh the expected opportunity costs.  Once in 
the U.S., the migrant accepts a job offer if real annual income Y
us is sufficient relative to the 
income Y
mx available upon return to Mexico.  Given that a job is offered, accepted, and 
maintained, the migrant decides the amount to remit, and how often to remit per year. At a 
minimum, income must cover subsistence level consumption plus any remittances, i.e. 
 
us us YR ≥+ C , where  is the total present value of annual remittances, including 
transaction costs, sent from the U.S. by the migrant, and 
us R
C is a subsistence requirement.   The 
inequality allows for the inclusion of a (constant) minimum subsistence requirement.
4  This 
remittance requirement plays only a minor role in our analysis, but is included as a reflection of 
the subsistence standard of living of those migrants with the more extreme remittance practices. 
Remittances from the U.S. are defined as the remittances received in Mexico (measured 
in U.S. dollars), plus the remittance fees and costs. Then annual remittances plus costs from the 
migrant’s perspective are 
                                                       
 
2 To be clear, remittances are split two ways: across remittance events so that per-transaction remittance is R/n, and 
average per person annual remittance, which is 
mx rR p = .  Thus, per person, per transaction remittance is
. 
mx np R n r / / =
3 We define each remittance to be in present value terms to simplify notation.   
4 The subsistence constraint is equivalent to imposing a discontinuity in the utility function at C  such that utility 
drops to zero at and below the subsistence level of consumption.  
  6   (2)  () 1( 1 )
us Rd R n t d R =+ +=+ + T
where d is the percentage transfer fee, t is a lump-sum fee per transaction, so that T is the present 
value of annual lump-sum transaction costs. The lump sum cost provides an incentive to the 
migrant to save up and remit less frequently.
5  However, surveys conducted in Mexico reveal 
that 80 to 90 percent of the remittance receipts are spent on such basic needs as school fees, food 
and healthcare.  Most of the recipients lack financial access and financial literacy.  In addition, 
small accounts incur heavy bank charges and there are limitations on the number of withdrawals 
from savings accounts.  As a result, remittances are usually characterized as “cash-to-cash” 
instead of account-to-account (IFAD, 2007).  This lack of financial services coupled with the 
day-to-day needs of the recipients make frequent remittances preferable to recipients. We thus 
assume a positive but diminishing marginal benefit to the household of more frequent remittance. 
Given this setting, the working migrant solves the constrained maximization problem: 
  ()( ) () () ( ,, , ; 1
us LCR UCRn Y C dR n t C C λ ⎡⎤ =+ − − + + + ⎣⎦ Z ) γ −
                                                     
 (3) 
Where U(ÿ) is given by equation (1).  Given this formulation, the marginal price of consumption 
is 1, the marginal cost of remittance dollars sent is (1+d), and the marginal cost of increasing the 
number of remittances per year is t. The first-order conditions for the migrant’s 
remittance/consumption problem are  
 
 
5 Note that these fixed and variable transaction fees can include a broad array of opportunity costs, such as time and 
money spent traveling to and from money transmission locations at both ends of the transaction.  The variable cost d 
can represent explicit per unit fees and other per-unit costs, as well as exchange rate differentials. 
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where subscripts other than the index i denote derivatives. Assuming necessary conditions hold 
for a maximum, annual remittance demand and the optimal number of remittances per year 
respectively are  
  () (
** ,, , ,;  ,, , ,
us us ) . R RY t d C nnY t d C == ZZ  (5) 
We are interested specifically in 1) the effect of income on remittances, 2) the 
relationship between remittance amounts and the frequency of remittances, and 3) the effect of 
differences in household marginal rates of substitution between consumption and remittance that 
follow from differences in the distribution of family and assets between the U.S. and Mexico. 
We first consider the comparative statics with respect to income.   If the benefits accruing 
through consumption, remittances, and remittance frequency are normal goods, then remittance 
per period increase with income (
* 0
us RY ∂∂> ), and remittance frequency increases with 
income (
* 0
us nY ∂∂ > ).  Thus, a first and straightforward hypothesis that follows from our 
model is, 
Hypothesis 1: A larger income will be associated with a higher (lower) probability of being in a 
higher (lower) remittance category.  
 
  8If the subsistence constraint is binding ( )  there will be a discontinuity in both the 
expansion path of remittances and the income-remittance relationship. Figure 1 shows the 
expansion path of remittances and consumption with increases in income.  Assume briefly for 
graphical simplicity that optimal remittance frequency is economically separable from 
everything other than the per-transaction fee t so that T= n
*t is fixed in the graph.
0
* > γ
6  Within the 
range  ()
* 0
us YC T −+ ≤  remittances are zero and will not increase with an increase in income. 
For the range  ()
* 0
us YC T −+ ≥ , remittance/consumption expansion path is such that the price 
ratio equals the marginal rate of substitution between remittances and consumption.  Figure 2 
shows the relationship between income and remittances.  For 
us Y and T
* the optimal level of 
remittances is () () () { }
** max 0, 1
us * R YC T =− + d + , which is represented by the discontinuous 
bold line in Figure 1.  The minimum remittance is  () () ()
* 1
us RY C T d =− + + .  Below this 
level, remitting is not worth the lump-sum cost T
*. 
Now consider the relationship between remittance levels and remittance frequency.  
Assuming the budget constraint holds exactly and for a fixed budget Y
us, the following equality 
holds: 
()
** * 1d dd dRt n C ++ +0 =
                                                     
 
Rearranging, we have 
 
 
6 In reality, income effects would likely lead to reductions in remittance frequency, thus lowering total transaction 
costs. 



























 are both the same sign in the relevant range, then both are negative.  This 
amounts to an income effect of remittance costs on total annual remittances, and expecting a 
negative sign for both is reasonable given that both R and C are normal goods.
7   At the 
subsistence level of consumption, n
* will equal zero because no remittances will be made.  
Further, the larger the optimal number of remittances, the larger the gap will be between zero and 
the minimum nonzero remittance as in figures 1 and 2. 
A more intuitively straightforward hypothesis (that we do not formally show) is that the 
demand for remittance frequency is downward sloping in per-transaction remittance costs.  
Given positive remittances as the per-transaction cost t increases for a chosen (optimal) 
remittance mode, fewer transactions will be made.  This discussion suggests the following two 
testable hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 2: High remittance frequency implies high total remittance costs, and will be 
associated with relatively low total remittance. 
Hypothesis 3: As the marginal cost of a remittance transaction increases, the frequency of 
remittances decreases. 
                                                      
 
7 Note that this is not a comparative static result with respect to the per-transaction fee t.  A change in this parameter 
would lead to both an income and substitution effect in each choice variable.  Unfortunately, we do not have 
transaction cost data to sufficiently characterize the menu of transaction modes for empirical analysis. 
  10Next consider the effect of differences in household marginal rates of substitution 
between consumption and remittance that follow from differences in the distribution of family 
and assets between the U.S. and Mexico.   The marginal rate of substitution of total consumption 
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 The willingness to substitute remittances for consumption in the U.S. is weighted by the relative 
importance the migrant attaches to the utility of the family members in each location. We have 
no compelling a priori notions as to the weights attached to individual family members.  
However, assume, for the moment, that ai = bi and the rate of substitution is based purely on 
relative numbers in the US and Mexico.  As the number of household members in Mexico 
decrease relative to those in the U.S. the marginal rate of substitution of c for r increases, so the 
migrant is willing to send lower remittances for a given set of relative prices and income.   Similarly, if 
the relative number of family members in the U.S. decreases, the amount remitted will increase.  
Graphically, if relatively more family members are in Mexico, the household utility function will be 
flatter in R-C space (as in Figure 1), providing a relatively larger marginal rate of substitution of c for r in 
the relevant ranges. 
Hypothesis 4: More (fewer) family members in Mexico and fewer (more) family members in the 
U.S. will lead to higher (lower) remittances. 
The migrant’s job security, U.S visitation security, and his/her plans for returning to 
Mexico also are likely to be important determinants of remittances.  If a migrant has a secure and 
steady job for any reported income level during their expected stay, the expected value of income 
will be higher and the variance of income will be lower, so remittances will be higher given 
  11stronger job security. Also, if the migrant is planning on being in the U.S. for only a short period 
of time, or if the migrant’s stay in the U.S. is tenuous (perhaps having no legal papers or because 
of job insecurity itself), the household may in expected value terms benefit from more 
remittances during their time in the U.S. Finally, if a migrant has strong investment interests in 
Mexico that must be financially serviced in Mexico, the value of remittances at the margin are 
likely to be higher.  Two more hypotheses follow: 
Hypothesis 5: Less secure employment and residence security in the U.S. will lead to higher 
current remittances. 
Hypothesis 6: Larger capital assets and liabilities in Mexico (U.S.) will lead to higher ( lower) 
remittance levels. 
Each of these hypotheses will be tested and discussed using the methods described in the 
following section. 
III. Data and econometric model 
  The data used in the statistical analysis are described in Table 1, and Table 2 provides 
their summary statistics.  The data come from survey questionnaires administered by the Pew 
Hispanic Center (PEW).
8    The surveys were conducted from July 2004 through January 2005 at 
Mexican Consulates in Los Angles, New York, Chicago, Atlanta, Dallas, Raleigh, and Fresno, 
and the respondents were all applying for a Matricula Consular, which is an identification card.   
                                                      
 
8   The Pew Hispanic Center bears no responsibility for the interpretations offered, or conclusions made based on 
analysis of the Pew Hispanic Center Survey of Mexican Migrants data. 
  12  Matricula consular cards have been around for about 130 years (US Congress, 2003).  
They are issued by foreign governments to migrants, identifying them as citizens of a particular 
country in case of an emergency or if stopped by law enforcement agencies.  Since 2001 the 
government of Mexico has issued over one million of the cards, and has urged their acceptance 
by local authorities in the United States.  As of 2003, more than 800 law enforcement agencies 
and 74 banks accept the matricula consular for identification purposes, and some local authorities 
accept it as a basis to grant benefits, including subsidized housing (US Congress, 2003).  
Applicants in the Pew sample could therefore have been remitting funds without the certificate, 
and were acquiring it for the other benefits.  For example, they could use it to open a bank 
account and thus diversify channels of remitting funds. 
  The data are from Mexican migrants who chose to apply for a matricula consular.  This 
raises the possibility of sample selectivity and estimation bias in relation to the population of 
Mexican migrants as a whole.  Unfortunately, we have no data on Mexican migrants who have 
not or will not find it in their interest to apply for the card, This limits our ability to know the 
extent to which it is a problem and to effectively address it.
9   However, if we presume that 
matricula consular cards are used primarily by people who otherwise do not have sufficient 
identification for their purposes, then migrants who have entered the U.S. illegally might be 
over-represented relative to the general population, and that this might be the most dominant 
selection criterion.  If it is also the case, ceteris paribus, that illegal migrants face an uncertain 
future in the U.S. and therefore remit more than they otherwise would if they were in the U.S. 
                                                      
 
9 A standard Heckman approach would suggest that selectivity is a problem if the unobserved heterogeneity (the 
disturbance process) in the selection equation were correlated with the disturbance process in the equation of 
interest, which in this case has income as the dependent variable.  (see Greene (2003) p. 782) . 
  13legally, then we would expect that our sample to have higher remittance levels on average than 
the population as a whole.  Although the categorical nature of our remittance data make a direct 
comparison difficult, note from Table 3 that the mode remittance level is in the category of 
remittances between $100 and $200, which corresponds to an annual remittance between $1200 
and $2400.  IFAD (2007) reports an average remittance of $2,128 per migrant from Latin 
American and the Caribbean, which falls within the modal category for our remittance data.  
This suggests, albeit weakly, that the sample selectivity may not introduce substantive estimation 
and inference problems. 
  Our empirical goal is to estimate the effect of various migrant characteristics on 
remittance levels and frequency.  The response variables of interest are therefore remittance per 
unit time and the frequency of remittance.  In our dataset, the measure of remittances per month 
is a categorical variable with seven categories ranging from $0 to >$500 in increments of $100 
(Table 3).  An ordered Probit regression would be a reasonable model to estimate the probability 
of an individual being in a given remittance category apply, except for two issues.  First, we 
expect a different type of income response for the first category (zero remittance), so the 
standard Probit model is too restrictive. Therefore, we use the more flexible generalized ordered 
Probit (GOProbit) regression model.  Second, some of our data pertains to chosen remittance 
mode, and these data are missing for migrants who do not remit anything.  We therefore 
generalize the standard GOProbit slightly to allow the set of variables that affects the choice not 
to remit or not to differ from the set of variables that affects the level of remittance given positive 
remittance.  As a result, the model we employ is the generalized ordered Probit counterpart to a 
  14type-II Tobit model (Heckit), which allows the index function of the censoring process to differ 
from the index function of the continuous part of the error distribution.
10  Formally, we 
characterize the decision process in terms of an underlying latent remittance demand and 
frequency, 
* R and n*.  We want to allow flexibility in the sample range of observed R, while still 
admitting our imperfect (categorical) observation of it.  As such, we begin by characterizing an 
unconstrained spline regression as a piecewise linear approximation to R
* (see Greene (2003), 
section 7.2.5 for a further description):
11 
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10 This “Type II” approach is similar in spirit to a double hurdle model, but is based on a univariate disturbance 
process rather than a bivariate disturbance process.  In a double hurdle model the choice to remit is determined by a 
separate regression (with a separate disturbance process) than that which determines remittance level given 
remittance.  In this case, we treat the zero remittances as the lower end of a continuum of remittance categories, but 
add flexibility to allow the determinants to differ for that first category. 
11 Note that knots are not imposed on this regression line, so this is not a linear spline.  Because knots are not 
imposed in the Generalized Ordered Probit regression model described below, this piecewise linear regression rather 
than a spline is the appropriate analogue. 
  15The  are nodes at which the regression line for R may change slope in the sample space of X. 
Thus, the functional specification of 
k μ
i R can then be modeled as
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 (9) 
where  represents the cumulative standard normal density function. () ⋅ Φ
Φ − x
12  The likelihood 
function for this type-II ordered Probit is  , where 
,   for k=1…6 and  .  Indicator variables   take the 
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12 This representation assumes two identification constraints:  0 0 = μ  and the variance of the normal distribution is 
normalized to one for all i.  Because parameters are allowed to vary across categories, negative predicted 
probabilities are possible with the generalized ordered probit for extreme values of independent variables 
(McCullagh and Nelder, 1989 p. 155).  
  16Given the nonlinearity of the effects of an explanatory variable on the probability of the response 
being in a given category, the parameter estimates are not equivalent to the marginal effects.  The 
change in the probability of being in category j with respect to a change in xi (the marginal effect 

































i ϕ  is the probability density function value associated with  .  For all but the first and 
last category, the sign of the marginal effect may be either the same or different than the sign of 
the parameter estimates  , because the effect of an increase in explanatory variables with 
 is to move some of the density into a category from below, and some of the density to the 
next larger category.  Thus, if a variable xk tends to lead uniformly to higher remittances, then 
the marginal effect of xk on the probabilities of low remittance categories will tend to be 






  The unconstrained GOProbit allows the parameters associated with a given explanatory 
variable to differ for each category.
13  For model parsimony, Wald tests are performed to test for 
differences within of each set of j parameters associated with a given explanatory variable.  If a 
test statistic for the null hypothesis of no difference among the j parameters is not rejected in a 
                                                      
 
13 Estimation is performed in Stata IC 11.0  with the GOLOGIT2 routine with the Probit link function, and using the 
MFX2 routine for calculating marginal effects. 
  17preliminary regression, then the parameters are constrained to be equal for that specific 
explanatory variable in the final regression.
14 
  Some of the variables associated with the first category (zero remittances) are only 
available if the respondent remits a nonzero amount.  Specifically, one survey question asks what 
mode of remittance they use (e.g. Western Union, bank card, through a friend, etc.).  Data for 
this question are missing for non-remitters.  We therefore omit the indicator variables related to 
this question from the vector that applies to the non-remitter category.  This is easily done in the 
GOProbit model by setting the variables to an arbitrary value for the non-remitters, and then 
restricting the first-category parameters for these variables to be zero.  This is equivalent to 
omitting the variables from the part of the likelihood function that corresponds to category 0 
(non-remitters).  
  Remittance mode and remittance frequency affect remittance transaction costs, which in 
turn may affect  remitted amounts. In principle, if transaction costs are low, income net of 
transaction costs would be higher, so there may be an income effect associated with choice of 
remittance frequency and mode.  Further, different remittance modes will likely have different 
marginal costs associated with total remittance (if costs are proportional to total remittance) or 
remittance frequency (if costs are proportional to a remittance event).  We therefore hypothesize 
                                                      
 
14 To illustrate, if we failed to reject equality of parameters for each explanatory variable, the standard ordered Probit 
would result. The literature on generalized ordered Probit models refers to the standard ordered Probit/Logit models 
as proportional odds or parallel lines models because they restrict the slope parameters to be the same across all 
categories.  The restricted generalized ordered Probit that restricts a subset of parameters to be the same across 
categories is sometimes called a partial proportional odds model. 
  18that remittance mode and frequency are jointly and endogenously determined along with 
remittance amount.   
Money transfer companies such as Western Union and Moneygram have historically 
been the largest and among the most costly remittance mode.  A survey in Los Angeles by the 
US Comptroller of the Currency found that 37 percent of those remitting to Latin America used 
wire transfer services such as these (Bernanke, 2004).   Due to substantial changes in the market 
for transfers in the last decade, many of these companies have changed their rate structures 
substantially (IFAD, 2007).  Transmission fees by Western Union now amount to a lump sum 
fee per transfer payable by the remitter.  The other types of remittance methods (“a bank”, an 
“electronic cashier”, “a credit union”, “a cash card”, “a friend, relative, or other person”, or “post 
office mail”) generally charge a lower transfer fee although the speed of transmission may be 
slower.   
Beyond the general information above, we do not have data on actual remittance costs.  
However, in order to capture the effects of transaction costs on remittances, we develop a set of 
instruments to address endogeneity of these variables that also act as proxies to distinguish 
between high-cost and low-cost remittance practices.    Let us suppose that for a given mode, 
transaction costs are proportional to the frequency of remittance, and that expected remittance 
costs are a function of the expected remittance frequency for a given mode  as well as the 
probability of remittance via that mode.  Specifically, a proxy for expected remittance costs can 
be defined as 
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  19Where  m η  represents marginal cost of a remittance event for mode m,   is the 
predicted frequency of remittance for a given mode, and   is the probability of mode 
m being used for remittance.  The index  is comprised of variables  and parameters 
.  Thus,  is a proxy for expected total remittance costs.  In practice,
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estimated via an ordered Probit regression on the categorical remittance frequency 
variable for each of the two mode categories, and  are estimated via a 
multinomial Logit with mode categories as the dependent variable.  
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For our dataset, 73% of our observations correspond to the Western Union-type 
remittance mode, and the other 6 modes each carry relatively small frequencies. We 
therefore economize in the second stage by using just two instrument categories: the 
Western Union-type mode, and all other modes.  Thus, our two instruments become 
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where the superscripts wu and o represent Western Union and other, respectively.  
Finally, the parameters  wu η and  m η are unknown, and in principle are represented by the 
parameter estimate in the second state remittance regression associated with the 
instrument.  Thus, the final (implementable) instruments used in the second stage 
regression are (with “hats” rather than tildes), represent two categories of expected 
remittance frequency/modes: 
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  20where the marginal cost proxy  wu η  is a parameter estimate in the second stage.  The second-
stage parameter estimate on  can be interpreted loosely as the mean effect of the “cost” of 
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In order for these instruments to be identified as components of the second stage regression, 
includes variables that are hypothesized to affect remittance modes but do not directly affect total 
remittance amounts (and therefore do not enter the second stage regression).  These variables 
will be discussed below. As is standard for first-stage instruments, all exogenous variables in the 
remittance amount regression are also included in the first stage ordered Probit and multinomial 
Logit regressions. 
i z
IV. Results and discussion 
Parameter estimates for the remittance regression are reported in Table 4.  Because these 
parameters are harder to interpret than marginal effects for this model, we will not discuss them 
in detail.  However, note that when we fail to reject the null hypothesis that a variable’s 
parameters do not vary across remittance categories, we restrict these parameters to be equal 
across remittance categories in the final model so that parameter estimates are for the effect of 
such a variable are identical in that variable’s row in Table 4.   Based on these tests, this “parallel 
lines” (or proportional odds) restriction is applied for all but four variables, namely earnings per 
week, the two remittance mode/frequency instruments  and     the number of children in 
Mexico (as well as the constant).  The parameters for  and  are restricted to zero in the zero 





Marginal effects of each explanatory variable within each category of remittances are 
presented in Table 5.  Virtually all significant results are consistent with the hypotheses that 
  21follow from our model.  Although a substantial number of the estimated marginal effects are not 
statistically significant at conventional levels, most of the signs of parameters with low statistical 
significance are consistent with our theory as well.  We will discuss these results in the context 
of the hypotheses developed earlier in the paper. 
The variable ‘Earnings per week’  has two components: The first is an indicator variable 
that takes the value 1 when earnings per week is zero.  This variable does not contribute to the 
predicted probability of being in a category. As Table 5 shows, the effect of earnings per week 
=zero on the probability of remitting nothing is positive, significant, and nearly 1.  Such a strong 
correlation should be no surprise: in order to remit part of one’s income, one must have income.  
The estimated effect on the probability of remitting a positive amount is statistically negative for 
each category, and progressively smaller for higher remittance categories.    
Conditional on having positive income, the probability of being in the two lower 
categories of remittance declines as income increases, but increases for the four higher 
categories.  The only one of these effects that is not statistically significant at α=0.01 is that 
pertaining to the lowest category of remittance.  This result is consistent with the analysis above 
and in figure 2, which shows that remittances at the level of zero are not responsive over a range 
of income. Based on our model this is because many of the individuals in this category are 
constrained by their incomes and are less likely than others to find it worthwhile to incur any 
lump-sum remittance costs they face unless their income rises.
15  Another interpretation for the 
insignificant income effect at zero remittances is that income does not play a role in the decision 
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  22to remit or not, even though it plays a part on the amount of remittance given positive remittance.  
Given our data, our primary interpretation and this interpretation are observationally 
indistinguishable, but it seems more likely to us that income is one of the factors affecting 
whether to remit nothing or a small amount, it’s just that transaction costs and other cost 
requirements hinder this transition at the lowest income/remittance levels.   
For those remittance categories between zero and $200 a month, a larger income has a 
significant negative effect on the probability that they remain in either of these categories, leads 
to a higher probability of remitting in one of the larger remittance categories.  It is also 
interesting to note that the income effect diminishes for the largest two remittance categories: 
higher income increases the probability of remitting in the two highest categories, but the 
marginal effect is not as large as the effect pertaining to remittances between $200 and $200.  
Another variable related to income is how many relatives work. The effect of an increase in this 
number is to increase the probability of being in higher remittance categories, and the effects are 
statistically very strong (p<0.01).  This is both consistent with hypothesis 1 and will be discussed 
below in terms of income security as well. 
Hypotheses 2 and 3 are related to income and substitution effects of differences in total 
and marginal remittance costs.  Remittance frequency and remittance modes are closely tied to 
relative transaction costs, and in our model they are jointly and endogenously chosen along with 
remittance amounts.  The variables   and  as defined in equation  ˆwu
i T ˆo
i T (14)  are included in the 
remittance regression as instruments of remittance cost of for Western Union (and similar) 
remittances, and for other remittance modes, respectively.  Because zero remittance implies no 
remittance mode, the parameters for these two variables are constrained to be zero for the zero 
remittance category.    
  23Before interpreting the results for the instruments,   and   ,  briefly consider the 




16  First of all, 
four variables are included in this regression that are not included in the second (remittance 
levels) regression, in order to ensure parameter identification of the parameters in the second 
stage regression.  These variables (listed at the bottom of table 5) include how much English do 
you speak, Do you have a US identification card?, Has bank account in the US, and paid by 
direct deposit.   We hypothesize they have a direct effect on transaction costs and mode 
opportunities, but no substantive direct effect on remittance levels. Of these, English speakers 
and US bank account holders remit more often than others.  This is consistent with the 
hypothesis that both of these factors make it easier and less costly to remit, inducing higher 
remittance frequency. 
17 We have no specific expectation regarding the parameter on Do you 
have a US identification card?  The English version of this variable (our short label for it 
notwithstanding) is Do you have a photo ID issued by a government agency in the U.S.  This 
question is sufficiently vague that it might pertain to anything from a state drivers license to an 
ID card issued at a consulate.  We include it, however, because the personal availability of 
identification is often crucial in determining available modes of remittance.  The other regressors 
listed in Table 6 are included in the second stage remittance level regression as well.  The 
                                                      
 
16 Recall that   and  were generated using two limited dependent variable regressions: an Ordered Probit on 
remittance frequency category, and a Multinomial Logit model for mode choice (each with the same set of 
regressors).  We include a discussion only of the more interesting Ordered Probit results.  The results of the 
Multinomial Logit regression are available from the authors on request.  Note also that remittance modes indicator 
variables are not included in the Order Probit model because they are in principle endogenous; and these firsts stage 




17 The variables τ
i in Table 6 are Ordered Probit threshold parameters of no particular interest for our purposes. 
  24statistically significant results include the following:  Having a spouse or more children living in 
Mexico leads to higher remittance frequency, as does having health insurance.  Remittance 
frequency is lower for people who have lived in the U.S. for longer, and for people who have 
been unemployed for more than a month in the previous year.  Finally, higher earnings lead to 
higher remittance frequency.  Each of these results is consistent with our model of the balance 
between remittance transaction costs and the benefits of remittance frequency including evidence 
of income effects in both levels and variance in disposable income. 
Returning to Table 5 (the remittance levels GOProbit regression), consider again the 
effects of remittance cost instruments   and    on remittance levels.   Table 5 shows that 
parameters associated with these two instruments are only statistically significant at α≤0.1 for the 
two highest remittance categories.  However, there is a clear and consistent trend for comparison 
among all categories.  For Western Union-type remittances, endogenous remittance frequency is 
positively correlated with lower remittance categories, but negatively correlated with higher 
categories.  The instrument for other modes shows the opposite trend: negatively correlated with 




According to hypothesis 2, more frequent remittances for a given remittance mode 
implies higher total remittance costs, leading to less total remittance.  Further, higher cost modes 
lead to less total (and perhaps marginal) remittances.  We infer from the above results that those 
remitting larger amounts often have other options (banks, bank cards or credit unions) that also 
have lower marginal transaction costs and lower foreign exchange transaction fees in Mexico.  
Further, the more frequent the remittances the lower the probability of remitting small amounts, 
given a fixed transaction fee.  These results are consistent with the apparent fact (based on out-
of-sample information) that Western Union remittance modes tend to be more expensive than 
  25other modes, and may be used primarily by those who do not maintain bank accounts for any of 
a number of reasons.  Western Union has pursued the remittances market more aggressively than 
other market players by conducting campaigns aimed at prospective migrants prior to departure 
and marketing campaigns in the country of destination (New York Times, 2007).  Newly arrived 
migrants with low incomes are thus more likely to be familiar with Western Union than other 
financial channels. 
Moving on now to other regressors in Table 5, the distribution of family members 
between Mexico and the U.S. show patterns of marginal effects generally consistent with 
hypothesis 4.  If the migrant has a spouse living with him or her in the U.S., the probability of 
remitting low amounts is larger and the probability of remitting high amounts is lower, and these 
results are statistically significant at the 5 percent level.  In contrast, if the spouse lives in 
Mexico, the signs of the parameters are exactly opposite for each remittance category. Although 
the estimates are statistically not significantly different from zero, the pattern of these effects is 
compelling especially in comparison to having a spouse in the U.S.  As the number of children in 
the U.S. household increases, the probability of remitting in each category less than $200 
increases while the probability of remitting more than this decreases, so more children in the 
U.S. leads to less remittance to Mexico.   All of the marginal effects are statistically significant.
18  
If more of the remitter’s children live in Mexico, he or she is statistically less likely to remit less 
                                                      
 
18 As one might expect, there is correlation between spouses living in the U.S. (Mexico) and children living in the 
U.S. (Mexico).  The correlation coefficients are 0.45 between spouse lives in the U.S. and # children in the U.S., and 
0.56 between spouse lives in Mexico and # children in Mexico.  The correlations between a spouse living separately 
from children are negative and smaller in absolute value.  These correlations can contribute to the statistical 
weakness of some of these results.  For example, when spouse lives in the U.S. is omitted from the regression, the 
parameters on # children in the U.S. become significant at the 10% level or lower. 
  26than $100 per month, and statistically more likely to remit between $400 and $500, meaning that 
the migrant is more likely to remit more given more children in Mexico.   
Marginal effects for the proxies for residence, employment, and financial security in the 
United States are generally consistent with hypothesis 5.  Asset ownership in Mexico and the 
U.S. also affects the amount of remittances.  If a remitter owns real estate or land in Mexico, they 
are significantly less likely to remit in any category less than $200, and more likely for 
categories greater than $200.  Interestingly, the effect of owning a business in Mexico is 
statistically weak, but it tends to be associated with low levels of remittance rather than high 
levels.  In contrast, if the remitter is an owner or proprietor of a business in the U.S., they are less 
likely to remit less than $200 and more likely to remit more (each of these marginal effect is 
significant at the one percent level).  These results are consistent with a setting in which land and 
real estate require loan or maintenance payments (such as mortgage or repair costs), and 
businesses provide net income at their respective locations. 
Remitters who have been in the United States longer (# years in U.S.) tend to remit less.  
Holding future plans and uncertainty constant, a migrant will have had more time to accumulate 
savings through remittance, and so has the capacity to remit less for any given goal.  Recall also 
that as the number workers in the respondent’s household who work in the U.S. (#  in household  
who work in U.S.) tends to increase the probability of remitting more.  As noted above, this result 
can be due to an income effect, but it can also be due to a security effect to the extent that 
household members rely on each other to pool income risk in the U.S., thereby allowing larger 
remittances with less subsistence risk. 
  27Remitters who have been unemployed for more than one month in the last year tend to 
remit more than those who have not.  This response is subject to several interpretations, but is 
consistent with a respondent reporting higher remittance when employed to make up for past and 
potential future unemployment.  Again, however, these effects are both small and weak.   A 
migrant who has health insurance is more likely to remit more than those without.  Again, none 
of these parameters are significant at conventional levels, but are qualitatively consistent with a 
higher propensity to remit under less income/expenditure uncertainty as suggested by hypothesis 
5.   If the remitter plans on remaining in the U.S. for more than 10 years (Expects to remain in 
U.S. >10 years), the probability of remitting less than $200 increase and the probabilities of 
remitting more than that decrease. Those who instead indicated that they will stay in the U.S. as 
long as possible are, by their response, indicating relatively strong ties to the U.S., but some 
uncertainty about their future in the U.S.  The results are similar to those associated with Expects 
to remain in U.S. >10 years, but are not statistically significant and are smaller.  The 
interpretation here is that the uncertainty they face reduces their expected stay, and so they 
account for this in their remittance levels.  The relatively higher variance of these estimates 
associated with will stay in the U.S. as long as possible are consistent with the vagaries of this 
response.  Presumably each has some expectation of their likely length of stay, but this 
expectation is likely to vary significantly among respondents who chose this response.   
V. Conclusion 
Migrant remittances from the United States to other countries are increasing, public 
policy with respect to undocumented migrants is under serious debate, and the market for 
remittance modes is changing rapidly.  Remittances now make up 20 percent of per capita 
income in Latin America, and on average, 90 percent of the proceeds go for subsistence needs 
  28(IFAD, 2007), so the impact on poverty alleviation therefore is significant.  There is also a 
secondary balance of payments impact, with remittances averaging 3 percent of exports in 2006 
(IMF, 2006).  The developmental impact is therefore also dependent on the macroeconomic 
policies of the recipient country, particularly with respect to exchange rates and financial sector 
reform.   
This paper examines some of the determinants of migrant remittance choices and is 
unique in its formal application of a net income hypothesis and explicit treatment of remittance 
transaction costs.  The data call for the use of what we term a Type II generalized ordered Probit 
model.  Results are very broadly consistent with the testable hypotheses developed in this paper.  
Although some of these results are statistically weak, the general patterns of even these 
statistically weaker parameter point estimates are substantially consistent with our hypotheses.  
We find that income has no effect on the probability of remitting nothing, but has statistically 
significant positive effects on the remittance conditional on remitting a positive amount.  Further, 
high transaction costs implied by high transaction frequency appear to have a negative income 
effect on remittances.  We find also that migrants with more family members in Mexico and 
fewer family members in the U.S. remit more (especially in the case of spouses); migrants with 
assets (land, other real estate) in Mexico tend to remit more, and migrants who are owners or 
proprietors of businesses in the U.S. remit more.  Measures that capture uncertainty regarding 
U.S. income, expenditures, or residency status all show that increases in uncertainty lead to 
larger remittances compared to those who face lower uncertainty in these measures. 
Transaction costs are a major determinant of the process by which remittances are made, 
and a difficult problem for remitters is commonly a lack of transparency about exchange rates at 
the receiving end of a transaction.  Current law restricts payments in Mexico to be made in 
  29pesos.  The lack of transparency and currency restrictions lowers competition by not permitting 
recipients to “shop around” and in effect establish dual exchange rates that discriminate against 
remittances.  Cross section estimates show that countries with dual exchange rates receive 40 
percent less remittances than those with liberalized rates (Lueth and Ruiz-Arranz, 2006).  Our 
estimates show the foreign exchange rate impact indirectly; remitters using money transfer 
organizations tend to send smaller amounts, probably because of high per-transaction  costs at 
both ends.  Liberalizing conversion rules in the recipient country would probably lower implicit 
transaction costs for remittances by improving remitters and recipients to more effectively shop 
for low-cost remittance modes, which might increase the probability of remittances of less than 
$100 most likely to low-income recipients for whom the poverty alleviating impact is greatest. 
Lueth and Ruiz-Arranz (2006) find a link between GDP growth rates in the recipient 
country and remittance flows. Their results on macro-level data suggest that a one percent 
change in the growth rate is associated with a 2.8 percent increase in remittances.  This is loosely 
consistent with our results, which show a positive relationship between higher remittances and 
asset ownership in the country of origin.  Remittances from individuals with substantial assets in 
Mexico are likely to have a greater development impact if they are applied toward the domestic 
savings and capital markets.  These results argue for growth promoting policies, not only for 
their sake, but because they have a ‘multiplier effect’ through remittance increases. 
Our analysis points to possible impacts of US policy measures regarding immigrants as 
well.  A more active process to interdict illegal migrants will have several offsetting effects on 
remittances.  Illegal migrants are likely to be in the lower wage groups, which according to our 
results would lead to a less than proportionate decline in remittances relative to the number of 
repatriations.  However, remaining illegal migrants would face a greater degree of uncertainty 
  30and a shorter expected stay on average.  They are also likely to have a proportionately larger 
number of dependents in Mexico.  Both of these factors would tend to induce more remittance 
per remaining illegal migrant, so the net effect is ambiguous. Similarly, a legal guest worker 
program would likely increase the per-migrant remittance per unit time of the participants during 
their stay, and will allow them more flexibility in remittance modes.  
Our results suggest a possible link between host country policies on security and 
remittances given that most remittances go for subsistence needs.  Assume for the moment that 
funds for illegal purposes move through informal channels.  Developing rules that limit the use 
of such formal channels as banks and other legal channels by illegal migrants would most likely 
increase volumes through informal means and make monitoring them for illegal funds more 
difficult.  A combination of financial restrictions in the home country and tighter controls in the 
host country has the effect also of reducing the flows and exacerbating poverty.  The impact 
might very well be the opposite of what both countries intended.  These and other issues that 
relate to the impact of immigration policy in the U.S. can have profound Impacts on remittance 
flows. 
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  34Table 1: Data descriptions 
Variable Name  Description of Variables 
Remittance level per month 
(Q43) 
0 =no remittances sent, 1 = less than $100, 2 = $100 to $199, 3 = 
$200 to $299, 4 = $300 to $399, 5 = $400 to $499, and 6 = more 
than $500. 
Earnings (Q39)  Income per week.  1 = $1-$100, 2 =$101-$199, 3 = $200-$299, 4 
= $300-$399, 5 = $400-$499, 6 = more than $500. 
Remittance frequency  Categorical responses to “How often do you send money to 
Mexico?” were translated into the number of weeks per year that 
an individual remits, so that a high number implies a higher 





Remittance modes  1=a company like Western Union or Moneygram, 2=a bank, 
3=electronic cashier, 4=a credit union, 5=a cash card, 6=friend, 
relative, 7=post office.  Dummy variable counterparts used to 
generate Used to generate instruments .  ˆˆ ,
ow
ii TT
Transaction cost proxies  
  ˆˆ ,
ow u
ii TT
See equation (14) and surrounding text 
Spouse lives in Mexico 
(Q8) 
1 if spouse living in Mexico and 0 otherwise. 
# children in the U.S. (Q10)  The number of respondent’s children living in the United States. 
# children in Mexico (Q9-
Q10) 
The difference between the total number of respondent’s children 
and the number of children in the U.S. 
Gender [male=1] (Q2)  Categorical variable of gender where 1 indicates male and 0 
otherwise. 
Age (Q3)  Age in years. 
Education level (Q5)  1 =did not attend or complete any schooling,  2 = completion of K-
11 but not finishing High School,  3 = completion of a secondary 
education at a Technical School, 4 = High School or equivalent 
graduation, 5 indicates college or more. 
Speak English (Q6)  1= a lot, 2= some, 3=a little, 4 = none 
Marital status (Q7)  Categorical variable of marital status where 1 indicates married 
and 0 otherwise. 
# years in the U.S. 
(Q22time) 
Categorical variable indicating number of years in U.S. where 1 
indicates 5 or less years, 2 indicates 6-10 years, 3 indicates 11-15 
years, and 4 indicates more than 15 years. 
Own land, Own real estate,  
Own business in Mexico 
(Q19) 
Equals 1 if respondent owns land, real estate, or a business in 
Mexico and 0 otherwise, respectively. 
U.S. Photo I.D. (Q 29)  Equals 1 if respondent has a photo ID issued by a U.S. Agency. 
Owner/proprietor of 
business in U.S. (Q34.3) 
Equals 1 if respondent is an owner or proprietor of a business in 
the U.S. 
#  in  household who work 
in the U.S.? 
(Q26)Unemployed > 1 
month last year (Q35) 
Equals 1 if the respondent had been unemployed for more than 
one month last year. 
Paid by direct deposit 
(Q40.1) 
Categorical variables equaling 1 if paid by direct deposit. 
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Bank account in the U.S. 
(Q46) 
Equals 1 if respondent has a bank account in the U.S. 
Has health insurance 
(Q48) 
 Equals 1 if the respondent has health insurance 
Expects to remain in U.S. 
>10 years (Q23) 
Response to the question: how long do you think you will remain 
in the U.S.?  
Will stay in U.S. as long as 
possible (Q23) 
Response to the question: how long do you think you will remain 
in the U.S.?  
How much English do you 
speak? (Q6) 
1= a lot, 2= some, 3=a little, 4 = none. 
Do you have a U.S. ID card? 
(Q29) 
Do you have a photo ID issued by a government agency in the 
U.S.? Yes=1, no=0, or missing. 
Has bank account in the U.S. 
(Q46) 
Yes=1, no=0, or missing. 
Paid by direct deposit (Q40.3) 
Are you paid in cash, by check, or through electronic bank 
deposit? 
=1 if electronic bank deposit, zero otherwise.  
 
Table 2.  Summary statistics of variables used in regressions.  Survey question numbers 
in parentheses.  N= 2976. 
variable mean  sd  min  max 
Remittance level per month (Q43)  2.39 1.75  0  6
Earnings per week=0 (Q39)  0.15 0.35  0  1
Earnings per week (Q39)  3.15 1.77  0  6
ˆo
i T : Transaction cost proxy, other mode  4.31 4.98 0  37.2
ˆwu
i T : Transaction cost proxy, Western Union mode  3.16 3.71 0  26.8
Gender [male=1] (Q2)  0.65 0.48  0  1
Age (Q3)  3.11 0.97  1.8  7.4
Education level (Q5)  3.05 0.95  1  5
Spouse lives with in the U.S. (Q8.1)  0.44 0.50  0  1
Spouse lives in Mexico (Q8.3)  0.11 0.31  0  1
# children in the U.S. (Q10)  1.24 1.48  0  6
# children in Mexico (Q9-Q10)  0.43 1.02  0  6
Owns land in Mexico (Q19.1)  0.15 0.36  0  1
Owns real estate in Mexico (Q19.2)  0.25 0.44  0  1
Owns business in Mexico (Q19.3)  0.02 0.15  0  1
# years in the U.S. (Q22time)  2.12 1.19  1  4
How many relatives work  2.60 1.80  0  20
Owner/proprietor of business in U.S. (Q34.3)  0.15 0.66  0  3
Unemployed > 1 month last year (Q35)  0.64 0.48  0  1
Has health insurance (Q48)  0.60 0.49  0  1
Expects to remain in U.S. >10 years (Q23)  0.04 0.19  0  1
Will stay in U.S. as long as possible (Q23)  0.42 0.49  0  1
How much English do you speak? (Q6)  2.53 0.95  1  4
Do you have a U.S. ID card? (Q29)  0.46 0.50  0  1
Has bank account in the U.S. (Q46)  0.68 0.47  0  1
Paid by direct deposit (Q40.3)  0.04 0.20  0  1
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Table 3. How much do you send per month on average?  
(Q43) Frequency Percent Cumulative 
zero 489 16.43 16.43 
0<remit/month<$100 422 14.18 30.61 
$100<remit/month<$199 875 29.4 60.01 
$200<remit/month<$299 504 16.94 76.95 
$300<remit/month<$399 257 8.64 85.58 
$400<remit/month<$499 165 5.54 91.13 
$500<remit/month 264 8.87 100 
Total 2,976 100 Table 4.  Parameter estimates, Generalized Type II Ordered Probit regression 
Explanatory variables ↓  Remittance ($R) → R=zero  0<R<100  100<R<199  200<R<299  300<R<399  400<R<499 
Earnings per week=0 (Q39)  -4.357
***  -4.357















i T : Transaction cost proxy, other mode  0
†  0.007






i T : Transaction cost proxy, Western Union  0
†  -0.071





Gender [male=1] (Q2)  0.268
***  0.268





Age (Q3)  0.064
**  0.064





Education level (Q5)  0.005
  0.005





Spouse lives with in the U.S. (Q8.1)  -0.134
***  -0.134





Spouse lives in Mexico (Q8.3)  0.120
  0.120





# children in the U.S. (Q10)  -0.046
**  -0.046





# children in Mexico (Q9-Q10)  -0.074
  0.143





Owns land in Mexico (Q19.1)  0.159
***  0.159





Owns real estate in Mexico (Q19.2)  0.104
**  0.104





Owns business in Mexico (Q19.3)  -0.234
*  -0.234





# years in the U.S. (Q22time)  -0.066
***  -0.066





How many relatives work  0.040
***  0.040





Owner/proprietor of business in U.S. (Q34.3)  0.048
  0.048





Unemployed > 1 month last year (Q35)  0.047
  0.047
  0.047 
  0.047
  0.047
  0.047 
Has  health  insurance  (Q48)  0.037  0.037  0.037   0.037 0.037 0.037 
Expects to remain in U.S. >10 years (Q23)  -0.190
*  -0.190





Will stay in U.S. as long as possible (Q23)  -0.054
  -0.054












*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  N=2976; 
†parameter constrained to equal zero 
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Table 5:  Marginal Effects from regression in Table 4, calculated at sample means.
 
Explanatory variables ↓   Remittance ($R) → zero  0<R<100  100<R<199 200<R<299  300<R<399 400<R<499 500<R
 




































































































































































Will stay in U.S. as long as possible (Q23)  0.0083  0.0128  -0.0063 -0.0076  -0.0036  -0.0020  -0.0016
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.   N=2967; 
†restricted to zero. 
 
  
Table 6. Dependent variable: Remittance frequency. Ordered Probit marginal 
effects. N=2976; Pseudo-R
2=0.126;  , p-value=0.000. 
2(22) 1189.7 χ =
Label Coef. Std.  Err. z P>z 
Gender [male=1] (Q2)  -0.200 0.048 -4.19  0.000 
Age (Q3)  0.040 0.030 1.36  0.175 
Education level (Q5)  -0.068 0.024 -2.83  0.005 
Spouse lives with in the U.S. (Q8.1)  -0.068 0.048 -1.42  0.155 
Spouse lives in Mexico (Q8.3)  0.166 0.083 2.00  0.046 
# children in the U.S. (Q10)  -0.020 0.019 -1.03  0.302 
# children in Mexico (Q9-Q10)  0.128 0.026 4.84  0.000 
Owns land in Mexico (Q19.1) -0.103 0.057 -1.82  0.068 
Owns real estate in Mexico (Q19.2)  -0.009 0.048 -0.19  0.853 
Owns business in Mexico (Q19.3)  0.135 0.132 1.02  0.306 
# years in the U.S. (Q22time)  -0.080 0.023 -3.46  0.001 
How many relatives work  0.015 0.012 1.26  0.209 
Owner/proprietor of business in U.S. (Q...  0.003 0.030 0.11  0.913 
Unemployed > 1 month last year (Q35)  -0.172 0.043 -4.03  0.000 
Has health insurance (Q48)  0.131 0.042 3.13  0.002 
Expects to remain in U.S. >10 years (Q23)  0.118 0.107 1.11  0.268 
Will stay in U.S. as long as possible (...  0.018 0.042 0.44  0.659 
Earnings per week (Q39)  0.403 0.014 27.91  0.000 
How much english do you speak (Q6)  0.110 0.025 4.33  0.000 
Do you have a US id card? (Q29)  -0.158 0.048 -3.29  0.001 
Has bank account in the U.S. (Q46)  0.190 0.051 3.68  0.000 
Paid by direct deposit (Q40.3)  -0.125 0.106 -1.17  0.241 
1 τ   -0.064 0.170  
2 τ   0.843 0.171  
3 τ  1.681 0.172   
4 τ   2.336 0.172   
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Figure 1.  Budget lines and indifference curves for the consumption/remittance choice, 
with lump-sum remittance costs and a subsistence constraint.  Note that remittances R 
jump from zero toR.  Below this point, the indifference curve is less steep than the 
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  43Figure 2: The bold line represents the relationship between income and remittances.  An 
increase in the lump sum cost of remittances T will increase the level of income needed 
for remittances to be sent, but if the marginal utility of consumption is discontinuous and 
sufficiently steep at C






+ =  (see figure 
1) .   For comparison, the other lines represent remittance levels with consumption and/or 
T  held at zero.  Holding consumption to zero results in a steeper remittance curve and 
holding  T C +  at zero forces the remittance curve through the origin. 
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